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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper traces the determinants of depositor discipline in Indian banking. Using 
data for the period 1997:1 to 2002:4, the findings reveal that, while bank-specific factors 
are dominant in case of state-owned banks, systemic variables tend to overwhelm bank-
specific factors in explaining behaviour of depositors of private banks. In case of private 
and foreign banks, policy announcements have an important bearing on the dependent 
variable. For state-owned banks, larger asset translates into higher deposit growth, 
suggesting that depositors are sensitive to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ effect. Finally, insured 
depositors tend to exercise discipline by compelling banks to pay a higher price on 
deposits. 
 
Key words: depositor discipline, contagion effect, deposit insurance, state-owned banks, 
India 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last two decades or so, both developed and developing countries alike have 
endured severe banking crises. The U.S. Savings and Loan (S & L) debacle in the early 
eighties, the Latin American banking crisis in the mid-eighties and more recently, the 
financial stress in Asian economies and subsequently in Argentina and Turkey are only a few 
examples. The costs of such crises have often been large, ranging from 3 per cent of GDP for 
the US S & L crisis to around 40-45 per cent of GDP for Thailand and Indonesia during the 
period 1997-99 (World Bank, 2001). At all times and, particularly, in order to avoid banking 
crises, authorities need to find ways to promote prudent behaviour by banks.  
There are two primary ways of monitoring banks. The one traditionally employed in the 
banking industry is regulation and supervision of banks (Mishkin, 2001). The other is 
corporate governance, which enables suppliers of finance to the bank assure themselves of 
getting a return on their investment. However, the fact that supervisory standards may be lax 
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has been vividly illustrated in some of the crisis-ridden Asian economies. The lessons from 
the Barings debacle and the more recent accounting irregularities in the United States have 
provided graphic evidence that corporate governance standards by themselves might not be 
adequate to stave off failures. A suggestion has, therefore, been made that supervisors should 
rely on ‘depositor discipline’ to supplant the traditional procedures. This enables market 
assessment of banking firms on a closer and continuous basis, enabling authorities to act 
sooner (thus avoiding costly delay) in case of any eventuality, because they can marshal 
independent evidence about the firm’s condition. 
The paper presents evidence from India regarding the existence of depositor discipline. 
We choose India as a case study for two main reasons: first, it is one of the most important 
developing countries of the world, and second, it has had a rich history of various types of 
banking sector controls (Demetriades and Luintel, 1996). Since the initiation of economic 
reforms in the 1990s, these controls have gradually been dismantled, allowing greater role of 
market forces in the resource allocation process.  
The highlights of the paper can be stated as follows. First, the study is the first for India, a 
country which has witnessed no major banking crisis in the 1990s, to test the existence of 
depositor discipline in the banking sector. Second, the database employed in the study 
comprises quarterly data on balance sheet and income and expenditure statement of 
commercial banks in India and to that extent, represents an improvement on earlier studies 
that rely on annual data. Third, in line with recent developments in econometric techniques, 
we employ dynamic panel data estimation procedures and therefore, represent an 
improvement over earlier studies for other emerging markets which employ static panel data 
approach. 
The findings reveal that, while bank-specific factors have an important bearing on the 
dependent variable in case of public sector banks, systemic factors, and in particular, policy 
announcements, in addition to bank-specific indicators, tend to be dominant in case of private 
banks. For foreign banks, the macroeconomic condition tends to overwhelm bank-specific 
factors in explaining depositor behaviour. In case of public sector banks, bigger banks 
(defined in terms of their total assets) translate into higher deposit growth, suggesting that 
depositors are sensitive to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ effect. For public and foreign banks, there 
exists evidence of contagion effects influencing the deposit accretion process. In sum, 
depositors ‘punish’ banks for risky behaviour, either by withdrawing deposits or and more 
importantly, by extracting higher price on deposits.  
The paper is structured along the following lines. Section I presents a brief overview of 
the relevant literature. Section II provides an overview of the financial repression process in 
India and the gradual move towards a market-oriented regime. A description of the data 
sources and measurement is provided in Section III. The empirical methodology used in the 
study in detailed in Section IV. Section V presents and discusses the empirical results. The 
concluding remarks are gathered in Section VI. 
 
 
LITERATURE ON MARKET DISCIPLINE 
 
Market discipline in banking is a process by which investors (bondholders/ 
depositors/investors) assess changes in bank risk and take actions leading to the adoption of 
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those measures needed to control the institution’s level of risk. The idea of leveraging 
depositor discipline to supplement supervisory efforts and corporate governance practices is 
by no means new. As Greenspan (2001) has remarked, ‘the real pre-safety-net discipline was 
from the market, and we need to adopt policies that promote private counterparty supervision 
as the first line of defense for a safe and sound banking system’. Even the proposed capital 
Accord of the Basel Committee has designated market discipline as one of the three pillars on 
which future financial regulation should be based, because ‘[market] discipline imposes 
strong incentives on banks to conduct their business in a safe, sound and efficient manner’ 
(BCBS, 1999). 
Most studies on depositor discipline focus on the experience of the developed banking 
markets, particularly the United States. The majority of the studies have primarily followed 
three different approaches. The first set of studies adopts the yield-based approach. In 
particular, they employ yield spreads (the difference between the market yield on bank debt 
and a risk-free asset like Government paper) as an indicator of the market’s perception of 
bank risk (Baer and Brewer, 1986; Ellis and Flannery, 1992, Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; 
Jagtiani and Lemieux, 2000). Overall, these studies support the hypothesis that yield on 
uninsured deposit contains risk premia. This, in effect, implies that uninsured depositors 
charge higher interest rates to riskier banks.  
A second set of studies adopts the quantity-based approach by analyzing to what extent a 
bank is able to raise (uninsured) debt. Covitz et al. (2000) find that relatively weak banks are 
unwilling (or unable) to issue sub-ordinated debt in bad times. Birchler and Maechler (2001), 
examining depositor discipline in the Swiss banking sector, find that depositors are sensitive 
to bank-specific fundamentals and to institutional changes in the Swiss depositor protection 
system. Two recent studies pertain to developing economies. The first, a case study of 
depositor discipline in Colombia finds that depositors prefer banks with stronger 
fundamentals and that banks tend to improve their fundamentals after being ‘punished’ by 
depositors (Barajas and Steiner, 2000). A second study for Argentina, Chile and Mexico, 
observes that even small, insured depositors exert depositor discipline by withdrawing 
deposits from weak banks (Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001).  
The final set of studies combine both the price- and quantity-based approaches. These 
papers examine depositor discipline by looking at the effect of depository’s institution risk on 
both the pricing and growth of uninsured deposits (Park, 1995; Park and Peristiani, 1998). 
Overall, these studies find that riskier banks pay higher interest rates, but, at the same time, 
attract smaller amounts of uninsured deposits.  
However, examining whether depositors ‘punish’ banks by withdrawing their deposits or 
extract a higher price in isolation may not suffice to draw inference regarding the existence of 
depositor discipline. In the absence of alternate investment opportunities, the depositors might 
perforce entrust their deposits with banks, but extract a higher price on deposits. In models 
that combine both the price and the quantity approaches, the existence of depositor discipline 
is inferred by testing the significance of the coefficient on the expected probability of default, 
after accounting for controls in terms of regulatory dummies and bank fundamentals. 
However, by directly including the probability of default, it is difficult to discern which of the 
bank indicators may be providing the strongest signals to depositors that banks are, in fact, 
assuming high risks (Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001). This, in essence, limits the 
empirical appeal of such models. Third, banking systems in several developing markets still 
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tend to be predominantly Government-owned, with a process of gradual divestment of 
Government holding being evidenced in recent years, which tests of depositor discipline 
needs to take cognizance of. Finally, there also lies the question of endogeneity of bank 
fundamentals, which needs to be tackled in order to arrive at consistent inferences.  
Market discipline is however, not an issue for developed countries alone. Nakaso et al. 
(2000), for instance, argue that depositor discipline did not operate efficiently in Japan due 
largely to insufficient financial infrastructure (weak accountancy norms, inadequate 
disclosure standards, etc). Even for the United States, evidence suggests that neither 
supervisors nor rating agencies nor equity investors are unambiguously more timely and 
accurate in their assessment of risk than others. All three groups produce valuable 
complementary information that contributes towards improving the performance of large 
banks (Berger et al., 2000). 
There are a number of potential benefits from enhancing depositor discipline in a 
country’s banking sector. First, by punishing excessive risk-taking by banks, increased 
depositor discipline may reduce moral hazard incentives. Second, depositor discipline may 
improve bank efficiency by pressurising some of the relatively inefficient banks to become 
more efficient or to exit the industry (Berger, 1991). Third, evidence indicates that markets 
give signals about the credit standings of financial firms, which, combined with inside 
information gained by supervisory procedures, can increase the efficacy of the overall 
supervisory process. Flannery (1998), for instance, suggests that market information may 
improve two features of the overall process for regulators by (a) enabling them to identify 
incipient problems more promptly, and (b) providing them an incentive and justification to 
take prompt action, once problems have been identified. He concludes that market 
information should be incorporated into the process of identifying and correcting problems. 
Finally, depositor discipline might be able to supplement traditional supervisory assessments 
to distinguish ‘good’ banks from ‘bad’ ones and therefore, lower overall social costs of bank 
supervision (Flannery, 2001). 
 
 
 
INDIAN BANKING AND MARKET DISCIPLINE 
 
The scheduled commercial banking system comprises Indian banks in public and private 
sectors and foreign banks operating in India.1 In the 1950s, the financial system in India was 
fairly liberal with limited control on interest rates and low statutory pre-emptions. The 
disconcerting findings of the All-India Rural Credit Survey Committee (RBI, 1954) of the 
inequitable distribution of bank credit raised misgivings about the ability of markets to 
                                                        
1 The banking system in India comprises of commercial and co-operative banks, of which the former accounts for 
around 98 per cent of banking system assets. The commercial banks, in turn, comprise of the 19 nationalised 
banks (majority holding with the Government) and the State Bank of India (majority holding being with the 
Reserve Bank of India, the country’s central bank) and its 7 associate banks (majority holding being with State 
Bank of India). These 27 banks comprise the state-owned banking system in India and accounted for, on average, 
over 80 per cent of commercial banking assets over the sample period. In addition, there are the old private banks 
and the new private banks (established post initiation of reforms in 1991-92) and the foreign banks. The entire 
segment is referred to as Scheduled Commercial Banks, since they are included in the Second Schedule of the 
RBI Act, 1934.  
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efficiently allocate resources.2 As a consequence, the Government tightened its control over 
the credit allocation process to ensure adequate credit flow into genuinely productive 
activities in conformity with Plan priorities. Towards this end, controls on lending rates were 
introduced, liquidity requirements were raised and a system of development banks, catering to 
various segments of industry and agriculture were established. The process culminated with 
the nationalisation of 14 largest commercial banks in 1969 and subsequently in 1980, with the 
nationalisation of 6 major commercial banks.3 The expansion of banking facilities purported 
to not only mop up potential savings, but also meet the credit gaps in agriculture and retail 
trade, thereby enabling to bring large stretches of economic activity within the organised 
banking system. At the same time, a strategy for agrarian development, which laid 
considerable emphasis on the provision of adequate credit to the agricultural sector, was 
initiated (Chakravarty, 1987). This led to intense pressure on the state-owned banking system 
to lend to ‘priority sectors’ (comprising agriculture, small-scale industry, retail traders and 
craftsmen). These lending requirements, initially stipulated at 33 per cent of a bank’s total 
credit, was, over a period of time, raised to 40 per cent.  
In addition, the financial sector suffered from several inefficiencies, the salient among 
which can be stated as follows: 
 
− First, financial institutions had significant restrictions on application of funds. By 
July 1991, commercial banks had to hold in cash reserves and government debt 
instruments as much as 63.5 per cent of increases in deposits in 1991-92: 25 per cent 
as cash reserve ratio (CRR), deposited with the central bank as reserve requirement 
and 38.5 per cent as statutory liquidity ratio (SLR), to be invested in eligible 
government securities. While the RBI introduced a Health Code System in 1985 to 
classify bank loans according to their performance, income recognition rules were 
highly subjective and reduced incentives for maintaining a high quality loan 
portfolio. 
− Second, the government regulated the use of financial instruments and access to 
financial markets, as well as all interest rates on deposits and loans-lending rates 
were fixed both for priority and non-priority sectors.  
− Third, competition was limited. Since nationalisation, the banking system was 
dominated by state-owned banks which accounted for over 90 per cent of total 
commercial banking assets and around 85 per cent of bank branches; the number of 
private banks remained stagnant and their branch expansion was restricted. 
 
All commercial banks, whether public, private or foreign, are regulated by the Reserve 
Bank of India (RBI). A process of liberalisation of the financial sector was initiated in 1991-
92, which aimed at creating a more diversified, profitable, efficient and resilient banking 
system (Government of India, 1991). The underlying philosophy was to make the banking 
system more market-oriented and to that end, engendered a shift in the role of the RBI from 
micro-management of banks operations to macro governance. While these reforms were 
                                                        
2 The All-India Rural Survey Committee observed that out of the total borrowings of Rs.750 crore for the 
cultivators in 1951-52, agriculturalist money lenders and professional money lenders accounted for 24.9 per cent 
and 44.8 per cent, respectively. 
3 The number has since been reduced to 19 with the merger of two banks in 1993. 
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being implemented, the world economy also witnessed significant changes, ‘coinciding with 
the movement towards global integration of financial services’ (Government of India, 1998). 
Against such backdrop, a second Government-appointed Committee on banking sector 
reforms provided the blueprint for the current reform process (Government of India, 1998). 
The noteworthy developments in the financial system over the period were as follows (Bhide 
et al., 2001): 
 
a) financial repression through statutory pre-emptions have been lowered. Illustratively, 
at end-March 2002, the CRR stood at 4.5 per cent (legal minimum of 3 per cent) and 
SLR was 38.5 per cent (legal minimum). 
b) The administered interest rate regime has been dismantled, allowing banks the 
freedom to choose their deposit and lending rates.  
c) Competition has been infused by allowing more liberal entry of foreign banks and 
permitting functioning of new private banks.  
d) A set of micro-prudential measures (capital adequacy requirements, income 
recognition, asset classification and provisioning norms for loans, exposure norms, 
accounting norms) has been stipulated. 
 
Until 1991-92, all state-owned banks were fully owned by the Government. Since the 
onset of reforms, several of the relevant acts were amended to enable the state-owned banks 
to raise capital upto to 49 per cent from the public. As many as 12 state-owned banks 
accessed the capital market and raised around Rs 65 billion till end-March 2002. A hallmark 
of the reform process in India has been its ‘gradualism’, which was the outcome of India’s 
democratic and highly pluralistic polity in which reforms could be implemented if based on a 
popular consensus (Ahluwalia, 2002). 
Evidence of competitive pressures on the Indian banking industry is evidenced from 
the decline in the five bank asset concentration ratio from 0.51 in 1991-92 to 0.44 in 
1995-96 and thereafter to 0.41 in 2001-02 and by the increasing number of private and 
foreign banks (Table 1).  
A number of factors make the banking sector in India an interesting case to study 
depositor discipline. First, over the 1990s, India has undergone a liberalisation of the 
banking sector with the avowed objective of ‘enhancing efficiency, productivity and 
profitability’ (Government of India, 1991). Second, most studies on depositor discipline 
pertain to countries with a history of banking crises. The present study is possibly the first 
of its kind for a country with no major banking crisis. Third, the banking sector witnessed 
important transformation, driven by the need for ‘creating a market-driven, productive 
and competitive economy’ in order to ‘support higher investment levels and accentuate 
growth’ (Government of India, 1998). Finally, it seems appropriate to conduct a study of 
depositor discipline for India, since it has made significant efforts to promote the role of 
market forces in regulating banks. Illustratively, since the late 1990s, supervisors have 
undertaken steps towards improving the quality and availability of information on banks. 
The importance of depositor discipline has also been recognised by the Reserve Bank 
wherein it has observed that ‘processes of transparency and market disclosure of critical 
information describing the risk profile, capital structure and capital adequacy are 
assuming increasing importance in the emerging environment…these processes enable 
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banks to strike the right balance between risks and rewards and to improve the access to 
markets’ (Jalan, 2002). 
 
Table 1. Summary of the Banking Industry: 1990-91 to 2001-02 (in Rs. billion) 
 
Year /Bank Group 1990-91 1995-96 2001-02 SOB Pvt. Forgn. SOB Pvt. Forgn. SOB Pvt. Forgn.
No. of Banks 28 25 23 27 35 29 27 30 40 
Total Deposit 2087 94 85 3908 361 306 9687 1694 645 
Total credit 1306 50 51 2075 219 225 4807 1164 486 
Credit-deposit ratio 0.63 0.52 0.60 0.53 0.61 0.75 0.49 0.68 0.75 
Share (in per cent) of           
 Total Deposits 92 4 4 85 8 7 80 14 6 
 Total Credit 93 4 3 82 9 9 74 18 8 
Total Income 271 10 22 536 53 61 1172 208 130 
Total Expenses 266 9.7 20 539 48 54 1089 190 115 
Total Profit  5 0.3 2 -3 5 7 83 18 15 
SOB. State-owned Banks; Pvt. Private Sector Banks; Forgn: Foreign Banks 
Source: RBI a, b (various years). 
 
 
DATA: MEASUREMENT AND SOURCES 
 
The study employs quarterly off-site monitoring and surveillance (OSMOS) data for 
commercial banks over the period 1997:1 to 2002:4. Two features about the data are in order. 
Firstly, consequent upon the introduction of off-site returns for banks since 1997, banks 
operating in India have been directed to submit data on mandated aspects of liquidity, 
solvency and asset quality on a quarterly basis. Second, the data have to be submitted within 
one month after the close of the quarter, and therefore, the timeliness of the information 
obtained enables the authorities to monitor and understand trends in important banking 
variables (Ghosh et al., 2003).  
Since depositors can exercise depositor discipline either by requiring higher interest rates 
and/or by withdrawing their deposits from riskier banks, accordingly, the dependent variable 
can either be a quantity or price variable. In case of quantity, the first difference of the log of 
time deposits is taken as the dependent variable, since this is the major (around 65-70 per 
cent) component of aggregate deposits. In case of price, since banks offers a multitude of 
rates, depending on classes of customers and types of products supplied, we define an implicit 
deposit rate defined as the change in the interest paid on deposits by change in total deposits.4 
The independent variables employed in the study comprise bank-specific, systemic (or 
banking industry-specific) and macroeconomic variables. The bank-specific variables are 
guided by the CAMEL methodology and covers the five major parameters of bank 
operations.5 The systemic variables seek to ascertain the impact of significant banking 
                                                        
4 Alternately, one could have worked with average cost of deposits, defined as interest rate on deposits to total 
deposits. That would have been less than ideal, because it is likely that a bank might be confronted a large 
marginal effect without showing a high overall average rate of interest paid. 
5 CAMEL is the acronym for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings and Liquidity. 
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industry-specific changes impinging on the depositor discipline. Finally, the macroeconomic 
variables control for the influence exerted by the state of the overall economy. The bank-
specific data have been obtained from the OSMOS database of the Reserve Bank of India. 
The systemic and macroeconomic variables have been obtained from Handbook of Statistics 
on Indian Economy (RBI, 2003).  
 
 
A Bank-specific Variables  
 
Capital Adequacy 
Capital adequacy is measured by the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets (CRAR). As 
a sound capital base should strengthen depositor confidence, we expect the capital adequacy 
variable to exert a positive influence on bank deposits and a lower interest outgo.  
 
Asset Quality 
A clear signal of asset quality is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. We 
employ the ratio of non-performing loans to total advances (NPL). As higher NPL is 
indicative of poor credit decision-making, we expect this variable to have a negative influence 
on deposits and an adverse outcome in terms of higher interest rates.  
 
Management 
To account for management quality, we include the ratio of non-interest expenditures to 
total assets (MANAGEMENT). This variable, which includes a variety of expenses, such as 
payroll, workers compensation and training in investment, reflects the management policy 
stance. A high level of expenditures in not-directly productive activities may reflect an 
inefficient management. We expect this variable to have a negative relationship with deposits 
and a positive linkage with the interest rate variable. 
 
Earnings 
We measure bank earnings (EARNING) by the return on asset ratio. In general, assuming 
we are adequately controlling for risk, we expect this variable to have a positive effect on 
deposits and an inverse relation with interest rate.  
 
Liquidity 
The cash with banks plus balances with central bank to asset ratio is included as an 
indicator of bank liquidity (LIQUIDITY). In general, banks with a larger volume of liquid 
assets are perceived to be safer, since these assets would allow banks to meet unexpected 
withdrawals. This would imply a positive relation between time deposits and liquidity and a 
negative movement between this variable and interest rate.  
In order to control for bank size, the natural logarithm of total asset (SIZE) is included in 
the regression to examine whether depositors respond to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ effect.  
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Bank-industry Specific Variables  
 
To control for the behaviour of the banking sector, the estimation procedure includes the 
ratio of cash outside banks to system deposits (CASH). This variable provides a preliminary 
way of testing for contagion effects. Contagion refers to a situation in which individual 
depositors at a given bank act according to what the rest of the banking system appears to be 
doing, after controlling for bank-specific and macroeconomic factors. This variable reflects 
the individual preference for holding currency relative to bank deposits. If depositors perceive 
an increase in systemic risks, they might decide to withdraw their deposit from banks, 
regardless of bank fundamentals. The value of cash outside banks over system deposits will 
increase and individual bank deposits will fall. Therefore, a negative correlation between 
individual bank deposits and CASH can be interpreted as evidence of contagion effects. A 
reverse argument holds between the interest rate variable and CASH.  
Secondly, we include the end of quarter yield on 364-day treasury bills (YLD364) as a 
proxy for monetary policy stance. A monetary contraction lowers the supply of funds, and 
thereby raises yield. In such a situation, depositors could end up parking more of their funds 
with banks or invest in alternate avenues, by comparing the risk-return trade-off. In case they 
choose to invest in bank deposits, they would seek a higher return. This would mean that the 
relationship between time deposits and YLD364 is not clear, a priori; however, its relation 
with interest rates is expected to be positive.  
Thirdly, similar to Demetriades and Luintel (1996), we include a dummy variable for 
policy (POLICY), indicating specific quarters when significant liberalisation measures 
impinging on depositor behaviour were undertaken. Accordingly, we assign a dummy 
variable which assumes value 1, if important policy measures were undertaken during that 
quarter and zero, otherwise. Illustratively, during 1997:2, the Bank Rate (the rate at which the 
central bank refinances commercial banks) emerged as a signaling rate and all important 
interest rates in the system were linked to it. Over the course of the quarter, the Bank Rate 
was reduced across the board. Data on such changes in policy have been culled out from the 
Annual Reports of the Reserve Bank of India. 6 
 
 
Macroeconomic Variables  
 
Deposits at individual banks can also be influenced by the state of the overall economy. 
In particular, we evaluate the effect of real GDP growth rate (GDPGR) and the consumer 
price index (CPI). The former variable reflects the relative strength of the economy, we 
expect it to have a positive relationship with the quantity variable and a negative relation with 
the price variable. As regards the latter, a higher value reflects greater uncertainty. Hence, we 
expect it to bear a negative relation with quantity (depositors seek to invest in alternate, high-
return sources) and a positive relation with the price variable (depositors seek higher return on 
deposits).7 
                                                        
6 It may be noted that such a dummy is introduced only for select quarters when important liberalisation measures 
were undertaken that might affect deposits or interest rates, in order to capture separate effects from the macro 
variable, e.g., GDP.  
7 Instead of employing CPI directly, we also tried with variability of CPI over the quarter. The results were 
unaltered with such specification. 
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Before embarking on an empirical analysis, we present some graphical evidence. Chart 1 
presents the implicit deposit interest rate for banks classified according to their non-
performing loan ratio: upto 10 per cent, above 10 and upto 15 per cent and above 15 per cent. 
First, the implicit deposit rate for banks with relatively low quantum of sticky assets (upto 10 
per cent) has been declining over time. And more importantly, the dispersion of the deposit 
rate between banks with high non-performing loans (above 15 per cent) vis-à-vis banks with 
low non-performing loans (upto 10 per cent) has been increasing over time. This would 
suggest that depositors have become more discerning to bank risk-taking, manifested in 
greater dispersion in terms of the deposit rate. 
 
Chart 1: Gross NPA and Implicit Deposit Rate
6.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
8.5
9.0
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
Year
Pe
r c
en
t
upto 10 10-15 above 15
 
 
 
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
The panel consists of 72 commercial banks (cross-section), comprising of 27 state-owned 
banks, 20 private sector and 25 foreign banks, for which consistent data is available from 
1997:1 through 2002:4 (time period), the most comprehensive time frame for which data on 
the concerned variables are available. The data on ‘outlier’ foreign banks (those with 
exceedingly high capital ratios and/or single bank branches) have been excluded from the 
sample. This omission is of negligible importance, since these omitted banks accounted for 
less than 1 per cent of the total assets of commercial banks. 
The reduced-form equation for the dependent variable assumes the following form: 
 
)1(,1,, titttiiti MACROSYSBANKTD ϕγδλμ ++++=Δ −   
 
such that i=1,2,…,N (number of banks) and t=1,2,…,T (number of quarters) and Δ indicates 
first difference. The panel is balanced, so T is the number of observations per bank. 
In equation (1), ΔTD represents the first difference of the logarithm of time deposits held 
by bank i at time t. The systemic and macroeconomic variables, which change only over time, 
are denoted as SYS and MACRO respectively. BANK is a vector of bank-specific 
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fundamentals, which is generally included with a lag to account for the fact that balance sheet 
information is available with a certain delay. μi is the bank-specific or fixed effect.  
A common test of depositor discipline is whether the estimates of λ are individually or 
jointly different from zero. If depositor discipline is not existent, deposit growth should be 
correlated with bank risk characteristics, and one would fail to reject λ=0. However, this, in 
itself, is not enough to conclude that depositor discipline is at work. Depositors can also 
discipline banks by requiring them to pay higher interest rates on their deposits. Therefore, if 
depositor discipline exists, then risky banks would be expected to pay higher deposit rates. 
This prompts us to also consider an alternate equation (2): i.e.,  
 
)2(''' ,1,, titttiiti MACROSYSBANKINTDEP ξγδλμ ++++=Δ −  
 
where the variable ΔINTDEP is the change in the deposit rate paid by bank i on its deposits 
(normalised by change in total deposits) at time t. 
The specifications (1) and (2) closely follows Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001), with 
one major difference. In their specification, they do not explicitly include controls for 
systemic and macro variables, but instead, introduce a time specific effect to capture the 
same. It is assumed that the error terms φit and ξit in equations (1) and (2) are independently 
distributed with zero mean and finite variance, σit2. Owing to the differencing of the 
dependent variable, observation for one quarter is lost from the sample. As a consequence, the 
effective sample period spans 1997:2 to 2002:4. 
The estimation procedure needs to tackle two major issues. First, rather than distort the 
available information by using arbitrary phase length (average of certain number of quarter), 
we choose to work with the original annual data in order to retain all the information. Thus, in 
turn, means that we need to use a dynamic specification in order to allow for inertia, very 
likely to be present in the dataset. Second, changes in deposit at time t are most likely to 
affect bank fundamentals from time t onwards. In that case, if one had contemporaneous bank 
fundamentals, the estimates are likely to be biased. In most specifications of this genre, bank 
fundamentals are lagged to account for this contemporaneity (Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 
2001). If, however, bankers are forward-looking, it is likely that they will anticipate that bank 
fundamentals at time t-1 affect deposits at time t. Therefore, banks might try to adjust their 
risk characteristics to prevent future deposit withdrawals.  
To address these issues, the empirical analysis is based on the generalised method of 
moments (GMM) estimators applied to dynamic models using panel data (Arellano and Bond, 
1991). First differencing (1) yields equation (3): 
 
)()()(')(' 1,,11,1,1,, −−−−− −+−+−+−=− tititttttitititi MACROMACROSYSSYSBANKBANKTDTD ξξγδλ  
          (3) 
 
We assume that bank fundamentals are weakly exogenous, i.e, E(BANKi,tξi,s)=0 for s>t. In 
that case, values of bank fundamentals lagged two or more periods are valid instruments in 
the equations in first differences. We assume that the systemic and macroeconomic variables 
are exogenously determined, in the sense that they do not react to bank individual deposits or 
the interest rate paid thereon. A similar transformation can be effected for equation (2). 
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The assumptions that the error term is serially uncorrelated and that the explanatory 
variables are weakly exogenous imply a set of moment restrictions that can be employed in 
the context of the GMM to generate consistent and efficient estimates of the parameters of 
interest. The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on whether the lagged values of the 
bank fundamentals are valid instruments in the regression procedure. A necessary condition 
for the validity of such instruments is that the error term, ξi,t be serially uncorrelated. To 
address these issues, we present two specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond 
(1991). The first is the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests for the overall 
validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample analog of the moment conditions used in 
the estimation process. The second test examines the hypothesis that the error term 
differenced regression, ξi,t -ξi,t-1 is not second-order serially correlated, which implies that the 
error term in the level regression, ξi,t is not serially correlated. The failure to reject the null 
hypotheses in both cases provides support to the model. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This section evaluates whether depositors respond to bank risk-taking. Before proceeding 
to discuss the results, Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the relevant variables at the 
bank group level. 
It is observed that CRAR, on average, is the highest for foreign banks and the lowest 
for state-owned banks. Likewise, NPLs are also the highest for the state-owned bank 
group. EARNING tends to be the highest for private banks, whereas state-owned banks 
have the highest quantum of LIQUIDITY: double the amount of that for foreign banks. 
Finally, the average real GDP over the sample period has been 5.86 per cent. 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics: Mean values of the Variables 
 
Variable State-owned Private Foreign All 
Bank specific Variables     
 CRAR 10.520 12.970 22.020 15.430 
 NPL 15.560 11.480 14.340 13.770 
 MANAGEMENT 21.630 12.040 10.530 14.480 
 EARNING 0.470 0.700 0.410 0.520 
 LIQUIDITY 7.670 7.220 3.610 6.070 
Number of observations 648 480 600 1728 
Systemic Variables     
 CASH 22.980 
 YLD-364 8.200 
Macroeconomic Variables      
 GDP growth 5.863 
 CPI 6.875 
 
The results of the analysis lend credence to the finding that deposits respond to bank 
risk taking (Table 3). Among the bank-specific factors, a rise in the CRAR fosters deposit 
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growth. Secondly, higher the sticky assets of the bank, lower the deposit growth. Thirdly, 
banks with relatively more liquid assets experience a fall in their deposit base, probably 
mirroring the fact of holding low yielding short-term assets as reflective of poor cash 
management. Fourthly, the coefficient on the SIZE variable is positive and significant at 
conventional levels, suggesting that larger banks are perceived as more ‘stable’ and 
consequently, depositors entrust their deposits with such banks.  
At the bank-industry level, there is limited evidence to support the presence of 
contagion. The coefficient on the CASH variable is positive and significant, alluding to 
the fact that deposits with the entire banking system grew at a slower rate than cash 
outside banks. The rapid growth of cash outside banks might be a consequence of 
increase in system-wide liquidity in the face of declining interest rates on bank deposits 
and limited alternative avenues for parking of funds by depositors.  
The validity of lagged values of time deposits and interest paid of deposits and the 
explanatory variables as instruments is crucial to the consistency of the GMM estimator. 
The results show that we are not able to reject the Sargan test. Moreover, we are not able 
to reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation. In other words, this 
suggests that the GMM model is well specified. 
The results pertaining to the interest rate variable also depict a similar story (Table 3). 
Banks with low capital adequacy and lower managerial ability pay higher interest rates. Also, 
banks with limited profitability end up paying higher implicit price. Finally, banks with 
higher liquidity pay higher interest rates on deposits, attesting to the fact that higher liquidity 
position in normal times is reflective of poor cash management.  
The next obvious question which arises is: how do these effects vary by bank ownership? 
Tables 4 and 5 provide some evidence on this issue.  
 
 
Table 3. Response to Bank Risk Characteristics 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Log (ΔTD) 
Dependent Variable: 
(ΔInterest Paid on deposits/ΔTotal deposits) 
Regressor Coefficient (t-ratio) Regressor 
Coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
Intercept -0.033 
(-2.11) 
Intercept 1.520 
(17.30) 
Bank-specific Variables  Bank-specific Variables  
CRAR 0.002 
(2.30) 
CRAR -0.019 
(-2.35) 
GNPA -0.003 
(0.08) 
GNPA -0.015 
(-0.88) 
MANAGEMENT 0.004 
(0.80) 
MANAGEMENT -0.047 
(-1.96) 
EARNING -0.004 
(-0.81) 
EARNING -0.202 
(-3.96) 
LIQUIDITY -0.005 
(-2.49) 
LIQUIDITY 0.254 
(8.04) 
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SIZE 0.32 
(4.04) 
SIZE -2.827 
(-4.98) 
Systemic Variables  Systemic Variables  
CASH 0.024 
(1.84) 
CASH -1.428 
(-19.03) 
YLD364 -0.006 
(-0.59) 
YIELD 0.142 
(2.65) 
POLICY -0.007 
(-0.28) 
POLICY 0.106 
(0.97) 
Macroeconomic Variables  Macroeconomic Variables  
GDPGR 0.011 
(1.49) 
GDPGR -0.302 
(-0.98) 
CPI 0.014 
(1.58) 
CPI -1.003 
(-1.19) 
Diagnostics Tests 
Tests of GMM consistency  Tests of GMM consistency  
Sargan test1 (p-value) 0.40 Sargan test1 (p-value) 0.62 
Serial Correlation test2 (p-
value) 
0.32 Serial Correlation test2 (p-
value) 
0.35 
R2 0.59 R2 0.71 
Number of banks 72 Number of banks 72 
Number of observations 1656 Number of observations 1656 
1 The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. 
2 The null hypothesis is the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second-order serial 
correlation. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Response to Bank Risk Characteristics–Bank Group-wise Analysis 
 
Bank group/ Regressor State-owned 
Banks 
Private Sector 
Banks 
Foreign Banks 
 Coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
Coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
Coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
Intercept -0.024 
(-3.49) 
-0.025 
(-2.75) 
-0.082 
(-1.98) 
Bank-specific Variables    
CRAR 0.001 
(2.68) 
0.005 
(1.39) 
0.008 
(0.43) 
GNPA -0.002 
(2.63) 
-0.008 
(-2.85) 
-0.001 
(0.83) 
MANAGEMENT 0.010 
(3.78) 
-0.0009 
(-0.51) 
0.028 
(2.27) 
EARNINGS 0.008 
(1.86) 
0.022 
(2.14) 
0.036 
(2.42) 
LIQUIDITY -0.002 
(-1.95) 
-0.001 
(-0.43) 
-0.013 
(-0.83) 
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SIZE 0.426 
(4.27) 
0.229 
(1.16) 
0.339 
(2.18) 
Systemic Variables    
CASH -0.009 
(-1.83) 
0.006 
(0.74) 
0.071 
(1.96) 
YLD364 -0.002 
9-0.50) 
-0.012 
(-2.31) 
-0.007 
(-0.23) 
POLICY 0.023 
(1.09) 
0.103 
(2.67) 
0.137 
(2.54) 
Macroeconomic     
GDPGR 0.003 
(1.06) 
0.05 
(1.22) 
0.022 
(1.89) 
CPI 0.004 
(0.66) 
0.004 
(0.90) 
0.050 
(2.15) 
Diagnostics Tests    
Tests of GMM consistency    
Sargan test1 (p-value) 0.30 0.41 0.39 
Serial correlation test2 (p-value) 0.36 0.24 0.21 
R2 0.57 0.52 0.51 
Number of banks 27 20 25 
Number of observations 621 460 575 
1 The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. 
2 The null hypothesis is the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second-order serial 
correlation. 
Dependent variable: log (ΔTD) 
 
For the public sector bank-group, for high capital adequacy is associated with 
significantly higher deposit growth, lending credence to this risk-weighted variable in 
explaining depositor behaviour (Table 4). Among others, poor asset quality and 
inefficient management practices tend to lower deposit growth in the concerned bank, 
while greater profitability encourages depositors to entrust their deposits with banks. 
Finally, greater liquidity tends to lower deposit growth. In normal times ample liquidity is 
often reflective of poor cash management; which acts as a negative signal to depositors 
about cash management practices of the concerned bank. This supports the work of 
Barajas and Steiner (2000) who, in their study of the Colombian banking system, found 
that higher liquidity in normal times is associated with lower rate of growth of deposits. 
At the bank-industry specific level, the coefficient on CASH is negative but significant, 
hinting at the possibility that when there is a generalised shift of deposits towards 
currency outside the banking sector, the average state-owned bank is negatively affected, 
even after controlling for fundamentals. This evidence is consistent with the presence of 
contagion. Finally, neither of the macro variables seems to exert any influence on deposit 
growth, hinting that the macroeconomic environment has insignificant effect in 
explaining depositor behaviour in state-owned banks. The diagnostics tests suggest that 
the model is well specified. 
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The results are, however, distinctly different in the case of private and foreign banks. 
For private banks in particular, deposit growth is mostly driven by capitalisation and 
profitability to the exclusion of other bank-specific variables. More importantly however, 
systemic variables play a crucial role in determining deposit growth among private banks. 
In particular, Deposit growth also responds negatively to YIELD, suggesting that a 
contractionary monetary policy prompts depositors to park their funds in alternate 
avenues.  
In case of foreign banks, on the other hand, the results seem to demonstrate that 
neither of asset quality, capital adequacy or liquidity play an influential role in harnessing 
deposit growth. Only managerial competence and profitability are important in 
influencing deposits, hinting at the possibility that depositors take limited cognizance of 
the overall soundness of foreign banks in entrusting their deposits. Since, more often than 
not, foreign banks mobilise wholesale deposits of high net worth individuals and 
corporates, it seems that capital position of foreign banks is of limited concern for these 
groups of depositors, possibly because they expect these banks to be bailed out by their 
parent company in case of exigencies. Unlike in the case of private banks, there is limited 
evidence to suggest the presence of contagion among the foreign banks as evidenced by 
the positive and significant coefficient on CASH. It is of interest to observe that deposit 
accretion in both private and foreign banks is significantly impacted by policy 
announcements: a favourable policy statement leading to larger deposit growth.  
The findings pertaining to the interest rate variable is presented in Table 5. The lower 
the quantum of sticky loans, the greater is the compensation required for depositors of 
state-owned and foreign banks. In case of private banks, however, this sign is found to be 
opposite. Given the relatively low quantum of non-performing loans of this bank group 
vis-à-vis their state-owned counterparts, it seems that the magnitude of their sticky assets 
are of limited concern to depositors. Bank capitalisation plays a crucial role in 
determining the interest rate paid by state-owned and foreign banks: greater the capital 
levels, lower the interest outgo. Interest rate paid by state-owned and private banks are 
driven negatively by non-interest expenses: lower expenditures tend to be associated with 
higher interest outgo. Lower non-interest expenses imply lower overhead costs (wage 
bill, printing and advertisement cost, etc). This, in effect, adversely affects customer 
sentiment regarding the service provided by the bank, so that the bank has to perforce pay 
higher deposit rates to attract customers. Earnings are important in explaining interest 
paid by state-owned and private banks. For all banks, increased liquidity is associated 
with higher interest outgo, which suggests that depositors ‘punish’ banks for poor 
liquidity management. Size is of concern to depositors of state-owned banks, possibly 
reflecting the public perception that larger banks have lower probability of failure (‘too-
big-to-fail”) and can afford to pay lower interest rates. The bank-industry specific factors 
are of important concern to most bank groups, with POLICY announcements having an 
important bearing on interest outgo for private and foreign banks. The macroeconomic 
variables play an important role in determining interest paid by private and foreign banks: 
expectedly, lower GDP growth is associated with higher interest rates. An uncertain 
economic environment as reflected in higher prices (CPI) is associated with lower interest 
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paid, reflecting consumer preferences to park their funds in bank deposits, irrespective of 
interest paid, in the face of uncertainties.  
Summing up the foregoing discussion, bank-specific factors are dominant in case of 
state-owned banks, systemic variables tend to overwhelm bank-specific factors in 
explaining behaviour of depositors of private banks. In case of state-owned banks, larger 
size of banks translates into higher deposit growth, suggesting that depositors are 
sensitive to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ effect. In case of private and foreign banks, policy 
announcements have an important bearing on the dependent variable. For state-owned 
and foreign banks, there exists evidence of contagion effects influencing the deposit 
accretion process. Therefore, we can conclude that there exists depositor discipline in the 
Indian banking system. 
Two additional issues assume relevance at this juncture: first, does the existence of 
depositor discipline differ between insured and uninsured depositors? The significance of 
the question stems from the fact that assuming a credible deposit insurance scheme, one 
can expect insured depositors to have fewer incentives to monitor bank risk-taking vis-à-
vis uninsured ones. Second, does the divestment of Government ownership in state-
owned banks have any bearing on depositor discipline? Dilution of Government 
shareholding in state-owned banks enables greater private participation, thereby possibly 
exerting greater prudence in their functioning. 
In case of the first question, the only available variable is the ratio of insured deposits 
to assessable deposits (DEPINS). The economic significance of this ratio lies in the fact 
that it captures the proportion of overall deposits of the concerned bank group covered by 
deposit guarantee. Illustratively, this figure for nationalised banks in 1997:2 was 0.778, 
implying that 77.8 per cent of the deposits of nationalised banks was covered by deposit 
guarantee, leaving 22.2 per cent of the deposits as uninsured. In India, since 1993, 
deposits upto Rs.1 lakh are insured.8  
 
Table 5. Response to Bank Risk Characteristics –Bank Group-wise Analysis 
 
Bank Group/Regressor Public Sector 
Banks 
Private Sector 
Banks 
Foreign Banks 
 Coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
Coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
Coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
Intercept 1.159 
(9.96) 
1.072 
(9.49) 
1.571 
(7.92) 
Bank-specific Variables    
CRAR -0.064 
(-1.70) 
-0.072 
(-1.48) 
-0.024 
(-2.04) 
GNPA 0.196 
(3.62) 
0.125 
(3.58) 
-0.067 
(-2.75) 
MANAGEMENT -0.238 
(-5.33) 
-0.062 
(-3.04) 
-0.044 
(-0.70) 
EARNINGS 0.981 0.433 0.136 
                                                        
8 1 billion=10000 lakh. 
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(5.59) (3.25) (1.60) 
LIQUIDITY 0.054 
(1.77) 
0.203 
(5.79) 
0.409 
(4.84) 
SIZE -3.984 
(-2.26) 
-0.193 
(-0.32) 
-1.080 
(-1.33) 
Systemic Variables    
CASH -1.099 
(-12.77) 
-1.165 
(-12.15) 
-1.710 
(-9.95) 
YLD364 0.190 
(3.29) 
0.121 
(1.84) 
0.187 
(1.45) 
POLICY 0.116 
(0.96) 
0.108 
(1.97) 
0.032 
(2.01) 
Macroeconomic     
GDPGR -0.362 
(-1.18) 
-0.272 
(-5.14) 
-0.291 
(-2.79) 
CPI -0.709 
(-1.61) 
-0.762 
(-12.36) 
-1.082 
(-0.978) 
Diagnostics Test    
Tests of GMM consistency    
Sargan test1 (p-value) 0.64 0.58 0.53 
Serial correlation test2 (p-value) 0.39 0.30 0.29 
R2 0.76 0.68 0.62 
Number of banks 27 20 25 
Number of observations 621 460 575 
1 The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. 
2 The null hypothesis is the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second-order serial 
correlation. 
Dependent variable: (ΔInterest paid on deposits/ΔTotal deposits) 
 
 
 
Table 6. Response to Bank Risk Characteristics –Insured versus Uninsured Depositors 
 
Bank Group/Regressor Public Sector Banks 
Private Sector 
Banks Foreign Banks 
Intercept  -0.022 
(-3.01) 
-0.027 
(-2.38) 
-0.062 
(-1.36) 
Bank-specific Variables    
CRAR 0.002 
(1.71) 
0.006 
(1.54) 
0.009 
(0.69) 
GNPA -0.023 
(1.96) 
-0.009 
(-3.66) 
-0.004 
(-0.78) 
MANAGEMENT 0.011 
(3.74) 
-0.002 
(-0.63) 
0.028 
(2.29) 
EARNINGS 0.008 
(0.83) 
0.024 
(2.41) 
0.036 
(2.44) 
LIQUIDITY -0.002 -0.001 -0.009 
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(-0.86) (-0.38) (-0.53) 
SIZE 0.428 
(4.22) 
0.179 
(4.32) 
0.341 
(2.20) 
Systemic Variables    
CASH -0.008 
(-1.72) 
0.004 
(0.65) 
0.078 
(2.11) 
YLD364 -0.0005 
(-0.15) 
-0.013 
(-2.14) 
 
-0.008 
(-0.29) 
POLICY 0.060 
(0.79) 
0.046 
(1.99) 
0.167 
(2.02) 
Macroeconomic     
GDPGR 0.002 
(0.84) 
0.007 
(1.35) 
0.026 
(1.22) 
CPI 0.001 
(0.43) 
0.005 
(1.04) 
0.036 
(1.34) 
DEPINS 0.003 
(0.73) 
-0.004 
(-1.11) 
-0.027 
(-0.92) 
Diagnostics Tests    
Test of GMM consistency    
Sargan test1 (p-value) 0.38 0.34 0.32 
Serial correlation test2 (p-value) 0.19 0.14 0.12 
R2 0.58 0.54 0.51 
Number of banks 27 20 25 
Number of observations 621 460 575 
1 The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. 
2 The null hypothesis is the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second-order serial 
correlation. 
Dependent variable: log (ΔTD) 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Response to Bank Risk Characteristics –Insured versus Uninsured Depositors s 
 
Bank Group/Regressor Public Sector Banks Private Sector Banks Foreign Banks 
Intercept 1.354 
(10.93) 
1.679 
(11.93) 
1.439 
(6.33) 
Bank-specific Variables    
CRAR -0.018 
(1.79) 
-0.050 
(1.09) 
-0.023 
(-1.01) 
GNPA 0.326 
(6.37) 
0.101 
(3.03) 
0.017 
(0.74) 
MANAGEMENT -0.242 
(-5.51) 
-0.054 
(-2.74) 
-0.011 
(-0.62) 
EARNINGS 0.978 
(5.67) 
0.378 
(2.98) 
0.128 
(1.72) 
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LIQUIDITY 0.069 
(2.28) 
0.222 
(6.61) 
0.377 
(4.26) 
SIZE -3.472 
(-2.00) 
0.592 
(1.16) 
-3.995 
(-4.27) 
Systemic Variables    
CASH -1.062 
(-12.49) 
-0.956 
(-9.96) 
-1.747 
(-10.06) 
YLD364 0.283 
(4.61) 
0.379 
(5.13) 
0.177 
(1.38) 
POLICY 0.016 
(1.09) 
0.421 
(2.36) 
0.232 
(2.39) 
Macroeconomic     
GDPGR -0.407 
(-8.66) 
-0.521 
(-8.42) 
-0.322 
(-3.06) 
CPI -0.771 
(-14.43) 
-0.918 
(-14.62) 
-0.986 
(-7.34) 
DEPINS 0.251 
(4.10) 
0.311 
(6.83) 
-0.027 
(-0.92) 
Diagnostics Tests    
Test of GMM consistency    
Sargan test1 (p-value) 0.66 0.62 0.60 
Serial correlation test2 (p-
value) 
0.41 0.28 0.26 
R2 0.86 0.79 0.74 
Number of banks 27 20 25 
Number of observations 621 460 575 
1.The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. 
2.The null hypothesis is the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second-order 
serial correlation. 
Dependent variable: (ΔInterest paid on Deposits/ΔTotal Deposits) 
 
 
Table 8. Response to Bank Risk Characteristics –Divestment of State-owned Banks 
 
Regressor Dependent Variable: log (ΔTD) 
Dependent Variable: 
(ΔInterest paid on 
Deposits/ΔTotal Deposits) 
 Coefficient (t-ratio) Coefficient (t-ratio) 
Intercept -0.014 
(1.86) 
1.263 
(11.21) 
Bank-specific Variables   
CRAR 0.002 
(1.96) 
-0.001 
(-0.21) 
GNPA -0.004 
(-1.03) 
-0.276 
(-5.62) 
MANAGEMENT 0.009 
(0.36) 
-0.289 
(-6.74) 
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EARNINGS 0.008 
(0.85) 
1.001 
(6.54) 
LIQUIDITY -0.001 
(-2.57) 
0.054 
(1.94) 
SIZE 0.611 
(5.55) 
-7.641 
(4.48) 
Systemic Variables   
CASH 0.004 
(1.96) 
-0.937 
(-11.51) 
YLD364 -0.0002 
(-0.05) 
0.241 
(4.38) 
POLICY 0.056 
(0.67) 
-0.044 
(-1.21) 
Macroeconomic    
GDPGR 0.020 
(1.69) 
-0.375 
(-8.43) 
CPI 0.003 
(0.83) 
-0.661 
(-13.03) 
DIVEST -0.020 
(-0.73) 
-0.637 
(-1.36) 
Diagnostics Tests 
Test of GMM consistency   
Sargan test1 (p-value) 0.36 0.49 
Serial correlation test2 (p-value) 0.24 0.29 
R2 0.59 0.72 
Number of banks 27 27 
Number of observations 621 621 
1 The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. 
2 The null hypothesis is the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second-order serial 
correlation. 
 
It is observed that the quantitative analysis with respect to deposits is materially 
unaltered after introduction of DEPINS (Table 6). In other words, the disciplining effect 
of markets in influencing deposit growth is not affected by the presence or absence of 
deposit insurance. The results are, however, altered when we consider the price variable 
(Table 7). While most variables retain their significance at conventional levels, it is 
observed that DEPINS turns out to be significant at conventional levels. This would 
suggest that insured depositors tend to exercise depositor discipline on banks not much 
by withdrawing their deposits from banks, but more by compelling them to pay a higher 
price on their deposits. This is also evidenced from the data which reveals that the share 
of bank deposits, on average, at around 36 per cent over the period 1997 through 2002 
constituted the largest source of financial assets of household sector as compared to other 
alternatives like shares and debentures or contractual savings whose average share over 
the same period were around 5 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively (RBI, 2003). 
As regards the second issue, we construct a variable DIVEST, which assumes value 1 
in the particular quarter and all subsequent quarters in which the bank has made an equity 
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offering; and zero, otherwise. Illustratively, if a bank had made equity offering in 1997:4, 
the variable DIVEST takes a value of 0 in the first three quarters and 1, thereafter. The 
advantage of such a variable is it enables to consider all banks, irrespective of whether 
they have made an equity offering or not. The disadvantage of such a variable lies in the 
fact that it does not discriminate the extent of divestment. Notwithstanding its limitation, 
DIVEST enables an inference of the impact of Government shareholding on depositor 
discipline.  
The finding, after inclusion of this variable, is exhibited in Table 8. It can be 
observed that lowering of Government ownership in state-owned banks seems to have 
had limited effect on depositor discipline. The economic intuition behind the same can 
broadly be summed up as under: the amendments to the Banking Companies (Acquisition 
and Transfer of Undertakings) Acts, 1970/80 in July 1995 have permitted state-owned 
banks to raise capital up to 49 per cent from the market, and at the same time, the 
minimum capital adequacy ratio which banks have to maintain has been raised to 9 per 
cent. This, in effect, has implied that the divestment process in state-owned banks has 
been driven essentially by the need to augment their capital base, with the Government, 
being the majority shareholder, still having a major say in corporate governance practices 
in bank boards. Consequently, although the Government shareholding in state-owned 
banks have declined, it has not had a significant impact on depositor discipline. The 
proposed amendments to the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of 
Undertakings) Bill, 2000 which seeks to reduce the minimum shareholding by 
Government in state-owned banks to 33 per cent is a welcome step in this regard. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The purpose of the paper has been to examine the existence of depositor discipline in the 
banking sector in India in the 1990s. Towards this end, we employed bank level data to 
estimate reduced form equations, in which the dependent variable has been modeled as 
function of bank fundamentals, systemic and macroeconomic variables.  
The results enable us to conclude that depositors in India ‘punish’ banks for risky 
behaviour, judged in terms of either the quantity or the price variable. This provides 
testimony towards the existence of depositor discipline in the banking sector in India.  
Prima facie, the results lend support in favour of regulatory efforts to increase the 
reliance on depositor discipline to control risk-taking behaviour by banks in the Indian 
context. However, there are several caveats regarding the findings in the paper and we 
venture to point these out for the informed reader.  
First, a more comprehensive test of the existence of depositor discipline involves 
understanding whether banks respond positively to the signals provided by depositors. 
Calomiris and Powell (2001) explore this issue for the Argentine banking system by testing 
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whether there is a tendency for individual banks’ deposit rates to revert to their mean, a 
behaviour consistent with depositor discipline; if interest rates rise too much (i.e., 
fundamentals fall out of line), then banks must take corrective action to ensure that interest 
rates fall again. This ‘mean reversion’ aspect is beyond the scope of the present study. 
Second, as pointed out by Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001), the study has not 
identified the specific channels through which depositors obtain information regarding bank 
fundamentals. Depositors might access such information from a variety of sources: bank 
balance sheet, newspaper articles, internet or even from financial advisors. The differential 
access to these different sources might shed light on what mechanisms promote more efficient 
depositor discipline.  
Finally, the quantity variable employed in the study is the first difference of the natural 
logarithm of time deposits, whereas the price variable is the implicit interest rate paid on all 
deposits. It would have been useful, in the absence of bank-wise data on deposit interest rate 
paid across the entire spectrum of deposits, to proxy the implicit interest rate paid by the 
change in interest expenses on time deposits alone divided by change in time deposits. Data 
constraints however prevent from taking such finer classification of the implicit interest rate 
paid into account.9 
Thus, while there are clear limitations of the usefulness of depositor discipline, the global 
trend is towards placing increased emphasis on market data in the supervisory process. The 
idea is not that market monitoring can effectively replace official supervision, but that it has a 
potentially powerful role within the overall regulatory regime. In a recent contribution, Caprio 
and Honohan (1998) remind us, in a similar vein, ‘broader approaches to bank supervision 
reach beyond the issues of defining capital and accounting standards, and envisage co-opting 
other market participants by giving them a greater stake in bank survival. This approach 
increases the likelihood that problems will be detected earlier…[it involves] broadening the 
number of those who are directly concerned about keeping the banks safe and sound’. 
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